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TORT LAW-NEGLIGENCE-AssuMPTION OF RISK-SPORTS INJURIES-
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that except in certain
specified instances, the doctrine of assumption of risk is abolished
in Pennsylvania.
Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County School District, 496 Pa.
590, 437 A.2d 1198 (1981).
On July 13, 1970, appellant Howard Rutter, a sixteen year old,
was injured during a summer football practice supervised by appel-
lees John North and Thomas W. George, Jr., football coaches at
Riverside High School.' At the time of the injury, Rutter, who was
playing in a game of jungle football,' was not wearing protective
gear.'
Appellant Howard Rutter and his parents filed suit.' The case
went to trial, and at the close of appellants' case, appellees moved
for a compulsory non-suit and the motion was granted.5 The trial
court en banc refused a motion to strike the non-suit 6 and that
decision was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently granted allocaturO and
reversed, holding in a plurality opinion that the trial court had
1. Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County School Dist., 496 Pa. 590, 594-95, 437 A.2d
1198, 1200 (1981).
2. Jungle football is a type of two-handed touch football where each team has four
downs to score. Its essential feature is a lack of any rules restricting passing. The offensive
team may pass the ball any number of times in any direction from any place on the field. Id.
at 596-97, 437 A.2d at 1201.
3. Id. at 595, 437 A.2d at 1200. Appellant was injured when a player from the opposing
side, appellee Greg Zimmerman, struck him in the right eye, causing blindness due to a
detached retina. Id.
4. Id. On April 16, 1974, a complaint in trespass was filed against Northeastern Beaver
School District, coaches North and George, and Greg Zimmerman. Rutter v. Northeastern
Beaver School Dist., 283 Pa. Super. 155, 159, 423 A.2d 1035, 1037 (1980).
5. See 496 Pa. at 595, 437 A.2d at 1200. See Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver School
Dist., No. 1042 of 1972 (C.P. Beaver County, fied Oct. 2, 1975).
6. 496 Pa. at 595, 437 A.2d at 1200. See Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver School Dist.,
No. 1042 of 1972 (C.P. Beaver County, filed July 5, 1978).
7. 496 Pa. at 595, 437 A.2d at 1200. See Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver School Dist.,
283 Pa. Super. 155, 423 A.2d 1035 (1980). The superior court affirmed the holding of the
trial court that plaintiff's evidence had established that the plaintiff could not recover be-
cause of the doctrine of assumption of risk. Id. at 159-60, 423 A.2d at 1037-38. The court
further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it prevented the plaintiff's
expert from testifying. Id. at 162, 423 A.2d at 1039.
8. 496 Pa. at 595, 437 A.2d at 1200.
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erred in refusing to allow the appellant's expert witness to testify;
in deciding that appellant had not presented enough evidence of
negligence to go to a jury; and in granting a non-suit because of
insufficient evidence of negligence and application of the assump-
tion of risk doctrine.'
Justice Flaherty, writing for the plurality,"0 noted the standards
for reviewing the validity of a non-suit.1" He stated that when re-
viewing the grant of a non-suit, the court must interpret the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all
conflicts to the plaintiff's advantage. A non-suit should only be en-
tered when the evidence viewed in this fashion clearly supports a
conclusion of no liability.
1 2
Using this standard to review the record, Justice Flaherty found
that the summer football program, sponsored by Riverside High
School and supervised by the school's coaches, proceeded without
the use of protective equipment by the players although the ses-
sions involved rough body contact. 3 The plurality also found that
students were informed by the football coach that they must not
only attend the practice sessions, but must participate in all ap-
sects of those sessions, including jungle football, or it would be un-
likely that they would make the team.14 Justice Flaherty further
noted that on the day of the injury, the coach had directed the
team to begin a game of jungle football1 5 and that the coaches
themselves had joined in the game; therefore, the coaches were not
in a position to supervise the play.1 Justice Flaherty also found
that the appellant had testified that he did not anticipate the loss
of an eye as an injury he was likely to suffer while playing
football.
17
The plurality observed that the lower court had held that the
9. Id. at 605-06, 437 A.2d at 1205. On appeal, Rutter argued that the trial court had
erred by: (1) entering a compulsory non-suit; (2) refusing to admit expert testimony; and (3)
holding that, as a matter of law, the appellant had voluntarily assumed the risk of injury.
Id. at 595, 437 A.2d at 1200.
10. Justice Flaherty's opinion was joined by Justices Larson and Kauffman. Chief Jus-
tice O'Brien concurred in the result.
11. Id. at 595, 437 A.2d at 1200.
12. Id. at 595-96, 437 A.2d at 1200. See McKenzie v. Cost Bros., 487 Pa. 303, 307, 409
A.2d 362, 364 (1979); Cushey v. Plunkard, 413 Pa. 116, 117, 196 A.2d 295, 296 (1964).
13. 496 Pa. at 596, 437 A.2d at 1200.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. Justice Flaherty indicated that the play was rough and that the participants




appellant had assumed the risk of injury, had not made out a case
of negligence, and that the appellant's expert should not be per-
mitted to testify."8 Addressing the issue of expert testimony first,
Justice Flaherty noted that the appellant had attempted to intro-
duce the testimony of a former football coach to show that the
football practices at Riverside varied from both the safety stan-
dards used at other schools and the rules of the Western Pennsyl-
vania Interscholastic Athletic Association.19 Pennsylvania, he
stated, has a liberal standard for the qualification of expert wit-
nesses.2 0 Since the appellant's witness was a former football coach,
he possessed specialized knowledge not within the common knowl-
edge of laymen.2 1 As this specialized knowledge was relevant to the
central issue of negligence, the plurality held that it was error to
refuse to admit the testimony.
2 2
Justice Flaherty then turned to the trial court's holding that the
evidence was not sufficient to permit the jury to consider the issue
of negligence.28 He noted that the trial court's decision was based
on the conclusion that no amount of care on the part of the appel-
lees could have prevented injuries such as the one suffered by the
appellant.14 According to Justice Flaherty, both the trial court and
the superior court, in arriving at this conclusion, had in effect re-
versed the standard for reviewing evidence when hearing an appeal
from a non-suit2 5 by viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the appellees.
Specifically, the plurality held that the superior court erred in
concluding that jungle football was no more dangerous than other
forms of football and that the coaches were not negligent in their
supervision.7 If the evidence were viewed in the light most
18. Id. at 597, 437 A.2d at 1201.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 597-98, 437 A.2d at 1201. See Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457
Pa. 321, 338, 319 A.2d 914, 924 (1974). "If [a witness] has any reasonable pretension to
specialized knowledge on the subject under investigation, he may testify. . .. " Id. (quoting
McCullough v. Holland Furnace Co., 293 Pa. 45, 49, 141 A. 631, 632 (1928)).
21. 496 Pa. at 598, 437 A.2d at 1201.
22. Id. at 596, 437 A.2d at 1202.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 598-99, 437 A.2d at 1202. The plurality observed that under the proper stan-
dard, "the plaintiff must be given the benefit of all favorable testimony and every reason-
able inference of fact arising therefrom and that all conflicts therein must be resolved in
favor of the plaintiff." Id. (quoting Cushey v. Plunkard, 413 Pa. 116, 117, 196 A.2d 295, 296
(1964)). See supra note 13 and accompanying text.




favorable to appellants, the plurality maintained there was at least
a jury question as to the relative dangerousness of the game and
the negligence of the coaches. 8 Similarly, noted Justice Flaherty,
the trial court en banc had reversed the standard, concluding that
neither the lack of protective gear nor the lack of supervision were
causes of the appellant's injury.29 Had the lower court applied the
correct standard, it would have found that the evidence presented
a jury question as to the coaches' negligence in not providing pro-
tective equipment or adequate supervision.
30
Turning to the question of whether the lower courts were correct
in holding that the appellant had assumed the risk of injury, the
plurality noted that the trial court had correctly cited the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts articulation of the doctrine of assumption
of risk but had erred in barring the appellant's action on the as-
sumption of risk theory.8 1 Using the Restatement as a guide, the
plurality articulated the elements of assumption of risk.
Justice Flaherty noted that the Restatement categorizes assump-
tion of risk cases into four separate types.32 He stated that this
case could involve the second category in which the plaintiff enters
voluntarily into a relationship with the defendant which he knows
to involve the risk, and so is found to have agreed, tacitly or im-
pliedly, to relieve the defendant of responsibility. 3 He also ob-
served that under Restatement section 496 C, any instance of im-
plied assumption of risk must involve the elements of knowledge
and voluntariness." Section 496 C also articulates the policy be-
hind implied assumption of risk, which is that the law refuses to
28. Id.
29. Id. The trial court had come to this conclusion through deciding that no amount of
supervision or protective equipment would have prevented appellant's injuries. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 600, 437 A.2d at 1202. "A plaintiff who voluntarily assumes a risk of harm
arising from the negligent or reckless conduct of the defendant cannot recover for such
harm." Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496 A (1965)).
32. 496 Pa. at 600, 437 A.2d 1202-03. The first type is an express assumption of risk.
In type two, the assumption of risk is implied by a relationship of the plaintiff to defendant.
In type three, the implied assumption of risk arises from the plaintiff knowingly and volun-
tarily encountering the hazard created by the defendant. Type four occurs when a plaintiff
unreasonably encounters a known risk. Since plaintiff's behavior is unreasonable, it is also
negligent in type four. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496 A comment c, illustra-
tions 1-4 (1965).
33. Id. at 600, 437 A.2d 1203. Section 496 A comment c, illustration 2 provides: "Plain-
tiff has entered voluntarily into some relation with the defendant which he knows to involve
the risk, and so is regarded as tacitly or impliedly agreeing to relieve the defendant of re-
sponsibility, and to take his own chances." Id.
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496 C comment a (1965).
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permit one who manifests willingness that another shall continue
in his course of conduct to complain of it later if he is injured as a
result.
3 5
Focusing upon the issues raised by the assumption of risk policy,
the plurality questioned whether the appellant in Rutter had man-
ifested a willingness that the appellee continue his conduct." Jus-
tice Flaherty indicated that section 496 C makes clear that not
every voluntary encounter with danger can be interpreted as a will-
ingness to accept the risk. Such conduct is perhaps evidence of
willingness, but it is not its equivalent.3 7 Further, according to sec-
tion 496 C, since interpretation of conduct is rarely so clearly indi-
cated that reasonable men could not differ as to the conclusion, it
is ordinarily a jury question whether what the plaintiff has done is
a manifestation of willingness to accept the risk. 8 Justice Flaherty
found that in this case, the appellant had not admitted that he
accepted or even knew of the risk.5 9 Therefore, the plurality con-
cluded, whether the appellant's behavior manifested acceptance is
precisely the kind of question which should be presented to the
jury. 4
Justice Flaherty maintained that even if the appellant's conduct
had. manifested a willingness to accept the risk, problems with re-
spect to knowledge of the danger and voluntariness of action re-
mained.4 1 He turned to the Restatement section 496 D, which as-
serts that assumption of risk cannot be implied from the plaintiff's
conduct unless the plaintiff then knows the existence of the risk
and appreciates its unreasonable character.42 Comment b to sec-
35. Id. comment b (1965).
36. 496 Pa. at 601, 437 A.2d at 1203.
37. Id. See RESTATE MzN' (SzcoNm) OF TorrS § 496 C comment h (1965), which
provides:
Manifestation of acceptance. The basis of assumption of risk is consent to accept the
risk. In order for assumption of risk to be implied from the defendant's conduct, it
must be such as fairly to indicate that the plaintiff is willing to take his chances.
Implied consent is consent which exists in fact, but is manifested by conduct rather
than words. It is not every voluntary encountering of a known and understood danger
which is reasonably to be interpreted as evidence of actual consent ....
Id.
38. See RESTATEMENT (SzcoND) OF ToRrs § 496 C comment h (1965).
39. 496 Pa. at 601, 437 A.2d at 1203.
40. Id.
41. 496 Pa. at 601-02, 437 A.2d at 1203.
42. 496 Pa. at 602, 437 A.2d at 1203. See RTATEmzNT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 496 D
which provides: "Knowledge and Appreciation of Risk. Except where he expressly so agrees,
a plaintiff does not assume a risk of harm arising from the defendant's conduct unless he
then knows of the existence of the risk and appreciates its unreasonable character." Id.
1983 819
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tion 496 D indicates that the basis of the assumption of risk doc-
trine is the plaintiff's consent to accept the risk.43 Therefore, in the
absence of an express agreement," the plaintiff will not be found
to assume any risk unless he has knowledge of its existence.4 5
Section 496 D, comment c indicates that the standard to be ap-
plied in assessing the plaintiff's knowledge and appreciation of risk
is a subjective one, involving what the plaintiff in fact sees, knows,
understands and appreciates. 6 It thus differs from the objective
standard which is applied in contributory negligence cases.41 Sec-
tion 496 D, comment e, indicates that whether the plaintiff has
knowledge of the risk or whether he appreciates its magnitude and
unreasonable character is a question of fact, usually to be deter-
mined by the jury, or by the court itself where reasonable men
could not differ as to its conclusion.' 8
Justice Flaherty maintained that it was obvious that the appel-
lant could not be found to have implicitly assumed a risk of which
he had no knowledge. 49 He emphasized that comment b states that
the whole concept of implied assumption of risk is based on the
actor's consent to accept the risk, which necessarily entails that he
understand the nature, character, and extent of the danger in ad-
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496 D comment b (1965).
44. Id. The agreement must be clearly construed to be express. Id.
45. Id. See 496 Pa. at 602, 437 A.2d at 1203. According to comment b, § 496 D, this
means that the plaintiff "must not only be aware of the facts which create the danger, but
must also appreciate the danger itself and the nature, character, and extent which make it
unreasonable." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496 D comment b (1965) (emphasis
added). Comment b also indicates:
Thus the condition of premises upon which [the plaintiff] enters may be quite appar-
ent to him, but the danger arising from the condition may be neither known nor
apparent, or, if known or apparent at all, it may appear to him to be so slight as to be
negligible. In such a case the plaintiff does not assume the risk. His failure to exercise
due care either to discover or to understand the danger is not properly a matter of
assumption of risk, but of the defense of contributory negligence. Id. See 496 Pa. at
602, 437 A.2d at 1203-04.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 496 D comment c (1965). See 496 Pa. at 602,
437 A.2d at 1204.
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 496 D comment c (1965). See 496 Pa. at 602-
03, 437 A.2d at 1204. Comment c further provides:
If by reason of age, or lack of information, experience, intelligence, or judgment, the
plaintiff does not understand the risk involved in a known situation, he will not be
taken to assume the risk, although it may still be found that his conduct is contribu-
tory negligence because it does not conform to the community standard of the reason-
able man.
§ 496 D comment c (1965) (emphasis added).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 496 D comment e (1965). See 496 Pa. at 603,
437 A.2d at 1204.
49. 496 Pa. at 603, 437 A.2d at 1204.
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dition to the facts which create it.50 Justice Flaherty emphasized
that the standard of knowledge is subjective, permitting the trier
of fact to consider the appellant's age, lack of information, experi-
ence, intelligence, or judgment.51 He indicated that the court was
concerned with what appellant actually knew and not with what
the reasonable man should have known.2
Justice Flaherty observed that the appellant was a high school
student of limited experience who had testified that he did not im-
agine he would lose his eye.53 Viewing these facts in light of the
Restatement, Justice Flaherty found it improper for the trial court
to have granted a non-suit on the basis of the appellant's supposed
assumption of risk.54 The plurality maintained that barring the ap-
pellant's action on an assumption of risk theory was also error be-
cause there was a question as to whether appellant's action was
voluntary." The court turned to Restatement section 496 E5 1
which states that the plaintiff's assumption of risk must be volun-
tary. Further, the plaintiff's assumption is not voluntary "if the
defendant's tortious conduct has left him no reasonable alternative
course of conduct in order to . . . (b) exercise or protect a right or
privilege of which the defendant has no right to deprive him.
'57
Justice Flaherty pointed out that the voluntariness of assump-
tion of risk remained an issue in Rutter because the appellant may
have been wrongfully forced to choose between two evils.58 He
stated that voluntariness cannot be implied merely from the fact of
a relationship, and the fact that appellant volunteered to play foot-
50. Id.
51. Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496 D comment c (1965).




56. Id. at 604, 437 A.2d at 1204-05.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496 E (1965). Comment c to § 496 E provides
in pertinent part:
A defendant who, by his own wrong, has compelled the plaintiff to choose between
two evils cannot be permitted to say that the plaintiff is barred .... Therefore,
where the defendant is under a duty to the plaintiff, and his breach of duty compels
the plaintiff to encounter the particular risk in order to avert other harm to himself,
his acceptance of risk is not voluntary, and he is not barred from recovery. The same
is true where the plaintiff is forced to make such a choice in order to avert harm to a
third person .... The existence of an alternative course of conduct which would
avert the harm, or protect the right or privilege, does not make the choice voluntary,
if the alternative is one which he cannot reasonably be required to accept.
Id.
58. 496 Pa. at 605, 437 A.2d at 1205.
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ball is not dispositive of whether he volunteered to play jungle
football." Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
appellant, the plurality assumed that the appellee's conduct was
tortious and that the appellant had a right or privilege to try out
for the football team. Further, the plurality concluded that the
football coach had implied that those who did not participate in all
aspects of the summer conditioning program would be unlikely to
make the team.60 Thus, Justice Flaherty found that there was at
least a jury question as to whether the appellant was compelled to
accept the risk of playing jungle football in order to exercise his
right to try out for the team.61 Additionally, the plurality held that
there was a jury question as to whether the appellant had a reason-
able alternative course of action. These jury questions being pre-
sent, the plurality ruled that the trial court was in error in granting
a non-suit based on assumption of risk."
Because of the serious problems of application of the doctrine of
assumption of risk, the plurality continued, it was necessary to ex-
amine the origins of the doctrine as well as the question of whether
it should continue to be applied in Pennsylvania." Justice Fla-
herty explained that assumption of risk is a relatively late develop-
ment in common law." Traditionally, the doctrine had been associ-
ated with master-servant cases where it was used to prevent
recovery by an employee from an employer for work-related inju-
ries. 5 He observed that the doctrine had never been restricted to
master-servant cases and had been used in many different circum-
stances and reflected the individualistic philosophy of the common
law that the individual is competent to protect himself.66 The com-
mon law does not assume to protect the individual from the conse-





63. Id. at 606, 437 A.2d at 1205.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 606, 437 A.2d at 1206. See Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 H~Av.
L. Rzv. 14 (1906) and W. PRossR, HANDBOOK OF ThE LAW OF TORTS § 68 (4th ed. 1971). See
also Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.&., 318 U.S. 54, 58-59 (1943), which asserts that the
main purpose of the doctrine was to protect the freedom of expanding industry.
66. 496 Pa. at 606-07, 437 A.2d at 1206. See Bohlen, supra note 65, at 14.
67. Id. Bohlen emphasized that the freedom of individual action is a foundation of the
common law. That idea implies that a person given his freedom can protect himself and,




Noting that the philosophy underlying the doctrine of assump-
tion of risk is now somewhat disfavored and that the doctrine
presents difficult problems of application, the court questioned
whether the doctrine should continue to survive in Pennsylvania
law and concluded that it should not.6 8 The court illustrated some
of the difficult problems of application of the doctrine. Under the
Restatement analysis, four distinct meanings are given to the term
assumption of risk.69 The first meaning involves express consent
given by the plaintiff to assume the risk. Under this meaning, the
defendant is relieved of his duty to exercise care to protect the
plaintiff.70 Under the second meaning, the plaintiff's consent is
tacit and is implied through a voluntary relationship between the
plaintiff and defendant. Under this meaning, the defendant is also
relieved of his duty to protect the plaintiff.71 The plaintiff's con-
sent is also tacit in the third Restatement meaning but the consent
is implied through the plaintiff's voluntarily encountering a risk
created by the defendant after becoming aware of the risk. The
fourth type is identical to the third except that the plaintiff's deci-
sion to encounter the risk is itself unreasonable and amounts to
contributory negligence. Thus, there is negligence on the part of
both parties and recovery by the plaintiff is barred.7
According to the plurality, the facts in Rutter potentially fit
within either the second or third type.7 ' Rutter's consent to as-
sume the risk could be implied by his entering into a voluntary
relationship with the defendant or it could be implied by his vol-
untarily continuing to encounter a known risk caused by the defen-
68. 496 Pa. at 607, 437 A.2d at 1206.
69. See supra note 32.
70. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToTS § 496 A comment c, illustration 1 (1965).
71. Id. comment c, illustration 2. The example is given of a spectator at a ball game.
The spectator may be seen as consenting that the game proceed without the players taking
precautions to protect him. Id.
72. Id. comment c, illustration 3.
For example, an independent contractor who finds that he has been furnished by his
employer with a machine which is in dangerous condition, and that the employer,
after notice, has failed to repair it or substitute another, may continue to work with
the machine. He may not be negligent in doing so, since his decision may be an en-
tirely reasonable one, because the risk if relatively slight in comparison with the util-
ity of his own conduct; and he may even act with unusual caution because he is aware
of the danger. The same policy of the common law which denies recovery to one who
expressly consents to accept a risk will, however, prevent his recovery in such a case
d. See 496 Pa. at 608, 437 A.2d at 1207.
73. Id. comment c, illustration 4.
74. 496 Pa. at 609, 437 A.2d at 1207.
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dant's negligence.7' The classification is important, Justice Fla-
herty observed, because in the second type, the voluntariness of
the conduct will not usually be an issue because a voluntary rela-
tionship is assumed. Once a situation is viewed as an example of
type two, the voluntary relationship then gives rise to the conclu-
sion that the risk has also been voluntarily accepted.76
To show that this conclusion will not necessarily be correct, the
plurality discussed the question of how a particular risk should be
defined. Given the facts of Rutter, one possible definition would be
the risk of all injuries related to training for and playing football.
The plurality pointed out, however, that another possibility would
be that the appellant assumed only the risk of participating in a
program conducted with adequate supervision and protective
equipment."1
Justice Flaherty indicated that the way in which the risk is de-
fined will influence the analysis of voluntariness. 78 In this case, the
appellant was familiar with varsity football and he voluntarily par-
ticipated in it. This does not, however, lead to the conclusion that
he voluntarily participated in jungle football if he was required to
participate in order to make the team.7 9 Justice Flaherty main-
tained that the voluntariness must relate to the risk which caused
the injury; any other voluntariness is irrelevant.80 Here, the appel-
lant's voluntary act was that he agreed to participate in a safely
conducted athletic program. Justice Flaherty found that whether
he also volunteered to participate in jungle football, assuming all
of the risks incident to that activity, is at least a jury question.8 1
The plurality noted that a similar problem had arisen in Green
v. Sanitary Scale Co. 2 In Green, the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that the trial judge erred in refusing to give the defen-
75. Id.
76. Id. The plurality explained that "the analysis of voluntariness seems to be that if
appellant voluntarily played football (i.e., if he voluntarily entered into a relationship with
the school district), he has voluntarily assumed the risk of injury due to playing football."
Id. (emphasis added by the court).
77. Id. at 609-10, 437 A.2d at 1207-08.




82. 431 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1970). In Green, the plaintiff was a sixteen year old employee
of a grocery store. While operating a meat grinder, he placed his hand near the grinder's
worm gear. The motion of the gear trapped his hand and drew it into the grinder blades.
The plaintiff testified that he had used the machine infrequently and had never been in-
structed on how to use the machine. Id. at 372-73.
Vol. 21:815
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dant's requested instruction on assumption of risk to the jury. A
strong dissenting opinion, however, argued that the definition of
risk used in the majority opinion was incorrect.8 s Because the dis-
sent used a different definition of the risk, there followed a differ-
ent analysis of both the voluntariness in assuming the risk and the
plaintiff's knowledge of the risk.
8 4
According to the Rutter plurality, the Green case demonstrates
that the problem of defining the risk not only is recurrent, but that
it also influences the analysis of the plaintiff's knowledge and vol-
untariness.85 The plurality stated that it is likely the lower courts
in this case did not recognize the issues of knowledge and volunta-
riness because they did not correctly define the risk. That same
mistake may also have led to the erroneous exclusion of the expert
testimony.86
The plurality suggested that not only is assumption of risk a dif-
ficult doctrine, it is duplicative of the concepts of scope of duty
and plaintiff's contributory negligence. 87 In support of this conclu-
sion, Justice Flaherty cited two cases from other jurisdictions
which had abolished the doctrine, Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad8 and McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co. s" In the latter
case, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that assumption of risk
added nothing to the issues of defendant's negligence and plain-
tiff's negligence.' The Rutter plurality agreed and concluded that
the issues in all negligence cases should be limited to the defen-
83. 431 F.2d at 375 (Staley, J., dissenting). See Rutter, 496 Pa. at 611, 437 A.2d at
1208. Judge Staley would have defined the risk as the danger of one's hand being drawn into
the worm gear by the meat if one places one's hand in the machine's funnel. The majority,
stated Judge Staley, defined the risk as the danger that one's hand would be injured if it
were placed into the worm gear itself. 431 F.2d at 375 (Staley, J., dissenting).
84. 496 Pa. at 611, 437 A.2d at 1208.
85. Id. at 612, 437 A.2d at 1208.
86. Id. at 612, 437 A.2d at 1209. The court explained that the expert testimony only
becomes relevant if the possible negligence of the coaches is related to the risk.
87. See 2 F. HARwER and F. JAMEs, THz LAw oF TORTS § 21.8, at 1191 (1956).
88. 318 U.S. 54 (1943). In Tiller, the court was construing legislation which appeared
to abolish the doctrine of assumption of risk in cases brought under the Federal Employers
Liability Act (FELA). Commenting on the doctrine generally, Justice Frankfurter, in a con-
curring opinion, stated: "Because of its ambiguity the phrase 'assumption of risk' is a haz-
ardous legal tool. As a means of instructing a jury, it is bound to create confusion. It there-
fore should be discarded." Id. at 72.
89. 41 N.J. 272, 196 A.2d 238 (1963).
90. Id. at 274, 196 A.2d at 239-40. The New Jersey court stated that assumption of
risk is used in two ways. In one, the defendant is not negligent, as he owes the plaintiff no
duty. In the other, the plaintiff is contributorily negligent. Thus negligence and contribu-
tory negligence are the true issues in an assumption of risk case. Id.
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dant's negligence and the plaintiff's contributing negligence.' 1 Jus-
tice Flaherty stated that the policy reasons which once supported
the doctrine are gone.'2 Further, in situations where the doctrine
would have been appropriate, the same results could be achieved
either through a determination that the defendant owed no duty to
the plaintiff or that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.93
The plurality concluded that, except in cases involving express as-
sumption of risk or in cases brought under a strict liability the-
ory,94 the doctrine of assumption of risk is abolished where not
specifically preserved by statute.'
Justice Roberts, in a dissenting opinion," stated that the appel-
lant had not presented any evidence which would support a jury
verdict that a breach of duty on the part of the appellees was the
proximate cause of the appellant's injury."' Absent such evidence,
stated Justice Roberts, the jury could only guess at whether pro-
tective equipment or better supervision would have prevented the
appellant's injury.98
Regarding the issue of the doctrine of assumption of risk, Justice
Roberts noted that because the appellant had not met his burden
of proof as to proximate cause, the issue of whether the doctrine
was applicable to this case was not properly before the court."
Thus, it is not appropriate to decide the continuing vitality of a
doctrine which the court has not previously questioned.100 Finally,
Justice Roberts, pointing out that only three of the seven partici-
91. 496 Pa. at 613, 437 A.2d at 1209.
92. The court pointed out that under Pennsylvania's Workmen's Compensation Act,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 41 (Purdon 1952), assumption of risk is abolished in most master-
servant cases. Id. n.4.
93. Id. See PA. BAR INST., PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CIVIL JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS § 3.04 (1981).
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A (1965).
95. 496 Pa. at 613, 437 A.2d at 1209. The appellant's motion to remove the non-suit
was granted and the case remanded to trial court. Id.
With this holding, Justice Flaherty noted that Pennsylvania joined nineteen other juris-
dictions which have abolished or severely restricted the defense of assumption of risk. Those
jurisdictions include Alaska, California, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon,
Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. at 613-14 n.5, 437 A.2d at 1209-10 n.5.
96. Justice Wilkinson joined in this dissent.
97. 496 Pa. at 616, 437 A.2d at 1211 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 617, 437 A.2d at 1211 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
100. Justice Roberts cited Jones v. Three Rivers Management Corp., 483 Pa. 75, 394
A.2d 546 (1978), as a recent case in which the doctrine was accepted without question. 496
Pa. at 617, 437 A.2d at 1211 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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pating justices had joined Justice Flaherty's opinion, stated in a
footnote that assumption of risk remains the law in
Pennsylvania.' 0 '
Justice Nix, in a dissenting opinion,102 asserted that assumption
of risk, a doctrine retained in most jurisdictions, is a necessary part
of tort law which has been needlessly complicated by the major-
ity.1 03 He acknowledged that assumption of risk and contributory
negligence do overlap, but stated that they are separate and dis-
tinct defenses.' 0" Assumption of risk is based on a theory of a
known risk while contributory negligence involves some fault or
departure from the standard of reasonable conduct.'05
Justice Nix stated that one indication that the doctrines are
truly distinct is the fact that contributory negligence must be the
proximate cause of an injury if it is to bar plaintiff's recovery,
while assumption of risk bars recovery even if it plays no part in
the causation of the injury.'" He cited an example of a case where
contributory negligence is absent but assumption of risk is applica-
ble. In Schentzel v. Philadephia National League Club,'07 the
plaintiff had been injured by a foul ball while watching a game at
defendant's ballpark. The superior court reversed a verdict for the
plaintiff, holding that the plaintiff had assumed the risk. To reach
this holding, the court concluded that the plaintiff knew that foul
balls sometimes go into the stands and injure spectators even
though there was no direct evidence on this point. The superior
court reached this conclusion because a plaintiff must be presumed
to know what individuals living in this society normally know. 08
The standard of a reasonable man's conduct, according to Jus-
tice Nix, is the benchmark of negligence cases and should be used
even in cases involving assumption of risk. 0 9 To make an excep-
tion for assumption of risk cases places the defendant in the all
but impossible position of attempting to prove the plaintiff's state
of mind." 0 Using the objective standard of a reasonable man in
this case, Justice Nix stated that it was clear that a reasonable per-
101. 496 Pa. at 617 n.2, 437 A.2d at 1211 n.2 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
102. Justice Wilkinson also joined in this dissent.
103. 496 Pa. at 617, 437 A.2d at 1212 (Nix, J., dissenting).
104. d. at 617-18, 437 A.2d at 1212 (Nix, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 618, 437 A.2d at 1212 (Nix, J., dissenting).
106. Id.
107. 173 Pa. Super. 179, 96 A.2d 181 (1953).
108. 496 Pa. at 618, 437 A.2d at 1212 (Nix, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
110. Id. See W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF ThE LAw OF TORTS § 68 (4th ed. 1971).
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son in Rutter's situtation would have been aware of the risk in-
volved in playing football and, specifically, jungle football.111 Rut-
ter had been on the team for two years and had played jungle
football during those years. 1 2 Thus, it was logical that the appel-
lant knew the risks involved and voluntarily assumed them.1 ' Fi-
nally, Justice Nix noted that the risk involved in jungle football is
no greater than the risk of playing football generally."" He con-
cluded that because the appellant had voluntarily assumed the risk
of playing football generally, he may not attempt to isolate one
segment of the risk he had voluntarily assumed.'
1 5
As the Rutter plurality noted, assumption of risk is a relatively
late development in tort law.1 ' The first cases adopting the princi-
ple of assumption of risk occurred either at the end of the eight-
eenth century or early in the nineteenth century. 17 Sometime after
1870, assumption of risk matured into a doctrine and became an
accepted part of tort law, especially in cases involving master and
servant.11 8 In these cases, assumption of risk operated to defeat a
plaintiff's recovery in one of two ways: 1) the plaintiff's assumption
of risk would be found to be an implicit term of the employment
contract;119 or 2) it would be found as implicit in a servant's con-
tinuing to remain in the master's employ after he knew or should
have known the risk involved.' The rationale for the doctrine lay
in public policy. Without such a doctrine, it was thought that suits




111. 496 Pa. at 619, 437 A.2d at 1212 (Nix, J., dissenting).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 619, 437 A.2d at 1213 (Nix, J., dissenting).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 606, 437 A.2d at 1205.
117. According to Prosser, Cruden v. Fentham, 170 Eng. Rep. 496 (1799), is the first
clearly distinguishable assumption of risk case. W. PROSSER, supra note 65, at 439 n.9. Wal-
lace identifies the first case as Illot v. Wilkes, 3B. & Ald., 311 (1820). Wallace, Volenti Non
Fit Injura in Actions of Negligence, 8 HARv. L. REV. 457, 462 (1894).
118. See 35 Am. JUR. Master and Servant § 294 (1941).
119. See Smith v. Baker & Sons, 1891 A.C. 325, 346 (Bramwell, L., dissenting).
120. See Brossman v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 113 Pa. 490, 6 A. 226 (1886). In Brossman,
the plaintiff was a brakeman who was killed when his train passed under a low bridge while
he was riding on the top of a car. The court held that once an employee becomes familiar
with the risks of his job, he accepts them by remaining in employment. Id. at 499, 6 A. at
228.
121. See Tuttle v. Detroit G.H. & M.R. Co., 122 U.S. 189 (1887). In this negligence
action, the court explained the rationale for the doctrine of assumption of risk by describing
it as "a rule of public policy, inasmuch as an opposite doctrine would not only subject em-
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The first major attack on the doctrine came legislatively rather
than judicially. In 1906, Congress enacted the Federal Employers
Liability Act (FELA)."' Although the act arguably intended to re-
move assumption of risk as a defense in cases arising under
FELA,'2 a the United States Supreme Court construed the act as
permitting the defense of assumption of risk. 24 Thus, it was sud-
denly important to distinguish between the similar doctrines of as-
sumption of risk and plaintiff's contributory negligence, as the for-
mer would bar recovery while the latter, under the terms of the
legislation, would only diminish it.
Although commentators and courts sometimes saw clear distinc-
tions between assumption of risk and plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence, 2 ' the federal courts had a difficult time distinguishing the
two doctrines.1 2 6 After twenty-three years of confusion, Congress
enacted an amendment to FELA, 27 which appeared to completely
bar the use of assumption of risk in FELA cases. s8 The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that assumption of risk re-
mained a valid defense under FELA,"9 but the Supreme Court re-
ployers to unreasonable and often ruinous responsibilities, thereby embarassing all branches
of business, but it would be an encouragement to the servant to omit the diligence and
caution he is duly bound to exercise ...." Id. at 196.
122. Federal Employers Liability Act of 1906, 45 U.S.C. § § 51-60 (1976).
123. See Buford, Assumption of Risk Under the Federal Employers Liability Act, 28
HAav. L. REV. 163 (1915).
124. Seaboard Air Line v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492 (1913). In Seaboard, the court held
that § 4 of the statute abolishing assumption of risk applied only when the defendant was in
violation of a specific federal statute. Id. at 501.
125. See, e.g., Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HARV. L. REV. 14, 91 (1906);
Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HAuv. L. REV. 233 (1908). The court in Seaboard had
no difficulty in distinguishing the two doctrines. See 233 U.S. at 503-04.
126. See Tiller, 318 U.S. at 63, where the court stated: "The language of the statute
itself seemed to impel the courts to practice the niceties, if not the casuistries of distinguish-
ing between assumption of risk and contributory negligence, conceptions which never
originated in clearly distinguishable categories but were loosely interchangeable until the
statute attached vital differences to them." Id. (quoting Pacheco v. New York, N.H. & H.R.,
15 F.2d 467 (1926)). The problems courts had in distinguishing the two is evidenced by the
fact that 172 cases involving the act came before the court in the first twenty-five years of
the act's existence. Schoene and Watson, Workmen's Compensation on Interstate Railways,
47 Hasv. L. REV. 389, 394 (1934).
127. Act of Aug. 11, 1939, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939) (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, 54, 56
(1976)).
128. 45 U.S.C. § 54 provides in part:
In any action brought against any common carrier under . .. [this Act] to recover
damages for injuries to ... any of its employees, such employee shall not be held to
have assumed the risks of his employment where the violation by such common car-
rier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury ....
Id.
129. See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 128 F.2d 420, 424 (4th Cir. 1942).
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versed, leaving little doubt that the doctrine was abolished in cases
arising under that enactment. 1 0
In other jurisdictions, the doctrine has been under judicial at-
tack. In 1959, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that assump-
tion of risk, would no longer be part of that state's law except
where plaintiff's consent to assume the risk was explicit.' Up to
the time of the Rutter decision, eighteen other states had aban-
doned or greatly restricted the doctrine judicially.13
2
This recent judicial attack on assumption of risk is very different
from the earlier legislative attack on the doctrine. Legislation such
as FELA and the various workers' compensation statutes"' abol-
ished or limited the doctrine because it consistently produced judi-
cial outcomes which were undesirable.'" The legislative disap-
proval of the doctrine was part of the movement away from the
common law's individualistic philosophy.'8 ' The current judicial
attack, however, has no apparent philosophical quarrel with as-
sumption of risk, but instead asserts that assumption of risk is
simply a phrase which adds nothing to the concepts of plaintiff's
negligence and defendant's duty to plaintiff. s If, indeed, assump-
tion of risk adds nothing to negligence concepts, judicial outcomes
reached using assumption of risk should not be altered if negli-
gence concepts alone are used, provided that assumption of risk is
130. See Tiller, 318 U.S. at 58. The court stated, "We hold that every vestige of the
doctrine of assumption of risk was obliterated from the law by the 1939 amendments ....
Id.
131. See Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959).
The case cited by Justice Flaherty, McGrath v. American Cyanamid, restated the holding of
Meistrich. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 95.
133. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §
41(b) (Purdon 1952).
134. See Buford, supra note 123, at 170 n.13. In passing FELA, Congress believed that
the law as it stood failed to meet "the modern industrial conditions." The law failed in that
its decisions placed the burden of industrial injuries on those less able to bear the injury. Id.
at 170-71.
135. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
136. Most of the cases cited in the opinion as abolishing assumption of risk express
this idea. See 496 Pa. at 614-15 n.5, 437 A.2d 1209-10 n.5. A few do not state that assump-
tion of risk adds nothing to negligence concepts, but state that assumption of risk is so
similar to negligence as to cause much confusion when it must be distinguished from plain-
tiff's negligence, as it must be when comparative negligence is the rule. See, e.g., Colson v.
Rule, 15 Wis. 2d 387, 390-91, 113 N.W.2d 21, 23 (1962). One case cited in the opinion is not
part of the recent judicial movement away from assumption of risk but instead restates an
old restriction of assumption of risk to parties to a contract. McWilliams v. Parham, 269
N.C. 162, 152 S.E.2d 117 (1967).
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applied correctly by the courts.1 37 The evil of the doctrine lies not
in its philosophy, but in its application. It is inherently confusing
and lends itself to incorrect application. 3
Whether or not assumption of risk really adds nothing to negli-
gence concepts is a question which has divided the authorities.1'
3
To shed some light on the question, it is helpful to state a classifi-
cation of assumption of risk cases used by both courts1 40 and schol-
ars.141 This classification divides cases into two types: primary, in
which the doctrine relieves the defendant of any duty to the plain-
tiff, and secondary, in which the plaintiff's conduct is unreasona-
ble. In secondary assumption of risk, the use of negligence con-
cepts clearly will achieve the same result, unreasonable conduct'
being also negligent conduct. The problem involves primary as-
sumption of risk, the question being whether a defendant who had
been relieved of his duty under assumption of risk will now have a
duty to a plaintiff if assumption of risk is abolished. Both of the
cases cited in the Rutter dissents, Jones v. Three Rivers Manage-
ment Corp.142 and Schentzel v. Philadelphia National League
Club 4" are examples of primary assumption of risk. It is possible
that either of these cases could have been decided for the defen-
dant without the use of assumption of risk. For example, in other
jurisdictions, cases involving injuries to spectators at baseball
games have been decided without using the doctrine, employing in-
stead a general rule which limits the defendant's duty to spectators
at sporting events.
1 44
Although this analysis does not conclusively show that all pri-
mary assumption of risk cases may be. decided in the same way
without using the doctrine, it does suggest how courts could decide
137. See, e.g., Feigner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 56, 133 N.W.2d 136, 154 (1965).
138. See, e.g., Meistrich, 31 N.J. at 50-51, 155 A.2d at 93-94.
139. Much has been written on this question. "The attempt to distinguish between the
affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk has been a favorite
subject of many courts, law journalists and reviewers." Frelick v. Homeopathic Hospital
Ass'n. of Del., 150 A.2d 17 (Del. Ch. 1959). For a description of the disagreement on this
issue among the advisors to the Reporter of the Restatement of Torts (Second), see Wade,
The Place of the Assumption of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 LA. L. REv. 5, 7 (1961)
and Halepeska v. Callihan Interest, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 378 n.3 (Tex. 1963).
140. See, e.g., Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 24, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1971).
141. See, e.g., James, Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952).
142. 483 Pa. 75, 394 A.2d 546 (1978). This case involved a plaintiff who was injured by
a batted baseball. The opinion reversed the superior court decision for the defendant, ana-
lyzing the case both in terms of assumption of risk and a "no duty" rule.
143. 173 Pa. Super. 179, 96 A.2d 181 (1953). See supra note 107 and accompanying
text.
144. See Felgner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 37 n.3, 133 N.W.2d 136, 148 n.3 (1965).
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such cases. A court could invoke a specific "no duty rule" which
limits the duty of a class of defendants to a class of plaintiffs.145
In Pennsylvania, assumption of risk has not been strongly ar-
ticulated as an independent doctrine. Although the phrase ap-
peared fairly frequently in nineteenth century master-servant
cases, 4" the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1943 wrote about as-
sumption of risk as if it were identical to contributory negli-
gence. 47 One author reviewing the situation in 1952, concluded
that assumption of risk had not, to date, been applied in Pennsyl-
vania independently of contributory negligence.1 48 A trial judge,
while holding that assumption of risk and contributory negligence
were indeed two distinct doctrines, noted that Pennsylvania courts
regard the two as the same. 49 Thus, not only have Pennsylvania
courts generally not distinguished assumption of risk as an inde-
pendent doctrine, they have usually recognized only secondary as-
sumption of risk. Viewed in this light, Justice Flaherty's abolition
of the doctrine is not as sharp a break from precedent as the dis-
sents suggest.
One additional indication that Rutter is not a sharp break from
Pennsylvania judicial tradition is the fact that Justice Flaherty
does not use a single Pennsylvania case in his lengthy analysis of
assumption of risk; he uses the Restatement exclusively. The de-
tailed presentation found in the Restatement is not even ap-
proached by any reported Pennsylvania case or cases.'50
With regard to assumption of risk, the Pennsylvania courts now
have three choices: first, accept Justice Flaherty's opinion and, for
145. See James, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185, 188
(1968). James views primary assumption of risk as nothing more than a collection of various
"no-duty" rules. Id.
146. See, e.g., Bemisch v. Roberts, 143 Pa. 1, 21 A. 998 (1891).
147. See Earll v. Wichser, 346 Pa. 357, 30 A.2d 803 (1943). In Earil, the plaintiff was
injured while riding on the tailboard of the defendant's truck. In its holding, the court de-
scribed the case as involving assumption of risk, as the plaintiff had voluntarily placed him-
self in a position of danger. The court then stated: "Hence a passenger who rides on the
running board of an automobile and is injured through the fault of the driver is . guilty
of contributory neligence as a matter of law." Id. at 359, 30 A.2d at 804.
148. 13 U. PiTT. L. REv. 769, 771 (1952).
149. Knepper v. Township of E. Taylor, 21 Cambria County L.J. 63 (1959). Before
holding that assumption of risk and contributory negligence were indeed distinct doctrines,
the court commented, "the courts in Pennsylvania seem to regard the defenses of assump-
tion of risk and contributory negligence as the same .... " Id. at 67.
150. It has been suggested that Pennsylvania courts would begin distinguishing be-
tween assumption of risk and contributory negligence if they were to adopt the Restatement
of Torts. See 13 U. PiTr. L. REv. at 771.
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most purposes, abolish assumption of risk;15" ' second, accept the
Restatement's detailed statement of the doctrine; or third, simply
rely upon case law where assumption of risk is not clearly distin-
guishable from contributory negligence. Choices two and three
present serious problems.
The problem with adopting the text of the Restatement is well
illustrated by Justice Flaherty's analysis. The Restatement's artic-
ulation of the doctrine may be sound in theory, but it is difficult in
aiplication. The problem with choice three is that it gives the
courts no clear way to distinguish assumption of risk and contribu-
tory negligence. This problem had been largely academic in Penn-
sylvania, but will be a problem with great practical consequences
now that comparative negligence has replaced contributory negli-
gence. 52 Justice Flaherty's solution may be the best.
It may not be long before the issue is again before the court.
Justice Flaherty's opinion was joined by only two justices of the
seven member court. As was recently stated by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, plurality opinions of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court are not considered binding prece-
dent. '5 Thus, the issue of the role of assumption of risk in Penn-
sylvania law is still unsettled.
Kenneth Joseph
151. See 496 Pa. at 613, 437 A.2d at 1209.
152. As noted in the opinion, Pennsylvania has recently adopted a comparative negli-
gence statute, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (Purdon 1981). 496 Pa. at 614 n.6, 437 A.2d at
12 n.6. In cases brought under a comparative negligence rule, it becomes imperative to
sharply distinguish between assumption of risk and plaintiff's negligence. The former will
bar recovery while the latter will only reduce it. Application of assumption of risk to com-
pletely bar recovery would seem to be at odds with the legislative intent in adopting com-
parative negligence. See 496 Pa. at 614 n.6, 437 A.2d at 1210 n.6.
153. Vargus v. Pitman Mfg. Co., 675 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1982). Appellants in Vargus
requested that the court vacate a district court judgment because of the change in Pennsyl-
vania law effected by Rutter. The court refused, holding that plurality opinions are ineffec-
tive to change Pennsylvania law. Id. at 74.
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